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I. INTRODUCTION
"Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most effective
weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government."' To control governmental
actions, the Fourth Amendment must be applicable. That applicability question is
a two sided inquiry: (1) does the governmental activity-which must be either a
search or a seizure-invade (2) an individual interest protected by the
Amendment?2 If one does not know what is protected by the Amendment, then it
cannot be determined what the government can do without implicating it. If one
does know what is protected, governmental intrusions of that protected interest
must be analyzed to determine whether they are considered a search or seizure and
accordingly required to be reasonable. United States v. Jones3 addressed that
applicability question and is the subject of this essay.
Jones is unlikely to have significant precedential value. The Scalia majority
opinion offers little that is new: physical trespasses have always been viewed as
implicating the Amendment and his opinion is notable primarily for reiterating that
baseline view. The concurring opinions of Justices Alito and Sotomayor offer
vague observations about various technologies, using the reasonable expectation of
privacy formula to project their views. Their comments are more likely to result in
confusion rather than guidance for lower courts, illustrating the failings of the
expectations framework. The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects."4 Grammatically,
there is a relational aspect to the right set forth in the Amendment, which speaks of
certain objects protected-people, houses, papers, and effects-but those objects
are not absolutely shielded. Instead, the right to be "secure" is protected and I
have long advocated invigorating that term and using it as the proper measure of
the protection afforded by the Amendment. In contrast, Jones is a recycling of
twentieth century arguments about property versus privacy that do not adequately
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I Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
2 See THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HiSTORY AND INTERPRETATION
§ 1.2. (2008) [hereinafter CLANCY, FOURTH AMENDMENT].
3 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
4 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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confront the issues in the digital age.
II. PROPERTY LAW ANALYSIS
The Fourth Amendment was a creature of the eighteenth century's strong
concern for the protection of real and personal property rights against arbitrary and
general searches and seizures.s Reflecting that origin, beginning with Boyd v.
United States6 and extending to the latter third of the twentieth century, the
Supreme Court framed Fourth Amendment analysis largely in terms of property
rights. Property rights analysis was used in two ways. First, in Boyd, the Court
created a hierarchy of personal property rights, with the permissibility of a search
or seizure premised on whether the government had a superior interest in the thing
to be searched or seized.7 Based on that hierarchy, the Court refused to sanction
any search or seizure of certain objects, regardless of the procedures utilized.
Boyd marked the first extended treatment of the Fourth Amendment, with the
Court giving the Amendment a liberal interpretation out of a concern that a strict
construction would allow the "silent approaches and slight deviations from legal
modes of procedure" by which "illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their
first footing."9 Boyd defined the "realm of personal autonomy" protected by the
Amendment "largely in terms of property rights."10
Second, beginning with Olmstead v. United States," the Court used property
law to define constitutionally protected areas and limited the Fourth Amendment
inquiry to the protection of tangible items from physical invasions. The Olmstead
Court was confronted with the question whether the installation and use of
wiretaps constituted a search if the taps were placed on telephone lines outside of
the suspects' homes and offices. 12 Although acknowledging that Boyd had stated
that the Fourth Amendment was to be liberally construed, a narrow majority gutted
that principle, stating: "[b]ut that cannot justify enlargement of the language
employed beyond the possible practical meaning of houses, persons, papers, and
effects, or so to apply the words search and seizure as to forbid hearing or sight." 3
The Olmstead Court limited the objects protected to tangible things: "The
Amendment itself shows that the search is to be of material things-the person, the
5 See CLANCY, FOURTH AMENDMENT, supra note 2, at § 3.1.2.2.
6 116U.S.616(1886).
7 Id. at 623.
8 Id. at 638.
' Id. at 635.
10 Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy, Property and
Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REv. 555, 580 (1996).
" 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
12 Id. at 457.
13 Id. at 465.
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house, his papers, or his effects."l 4 Conversations were not protected because they
were not on the list of tangible objects specified in the Amendment. The Court
also grounded its decision on the belief that there was "no entry of the houses or
offices of the defendants." 5 It reasoned that the telephone lines outside the
buildings where the taps were placed were "not part of [a] house or office, any
more than are the highways along which they are stretched." 6  Thus, the
interception of the conversations was not an intrusion into an area protected by the
Amendment.
The Court also limited the type of governmental activity that was regulated by
the Amendment to physical invasions of the protected areas.' 7  There was no
search or seizure when the wiretaps were installed outside the buildings because
there was no physical entry into a house or an office. Recording a conversation,
which the Court viewed as akin to eavesdropping, did not entail a physical
invasion and, therefore, was not a search or seizure.
Based on Olmstead, for much of the twentieth century, the Fourth
Amendment only regulated physical trespasses within constitutionally protected
areas and searches and seizures of people and tangible physical objects. This is to
say that Olmstead's conjunction of literalism and property theory "guaranteed that
the Fourth Amendment would be irrelevant as a device for regulating the use of
new technologies that allowed the government to invade formerly private places
without committing a common law trespass." 8  The aspect of Olmstead that
limited the objects protected to tangible things attenuated prior to Katz' 9 and the
Court ultimately recognized that oral conversations could be the object of a search
or seizure. 20 However, the part of the theory requiring a physical invasion into a
protected area remained a cornerstone Fourth Amendment principle until Katz in
1967. It was within the defined constitutionally protected areas that a person could
be secure.2' Justice Scalia, in Jones, utilized that conception of the Amendment,
and obtained Sotomayor's concurrence, because it sufficed to dispose of the case.
III. PRIVACY ANALYSIS
Underlying Boyd and Olmstead were two conflicting visions of the Fourth
Amendment, with the former advocating a liberal construction and the latter a
literal one. However, because Olmstead primarily concerned the areas into which
" Id. at 464.
'5 Id.
16 Id. at 465.
" Id. at 466.
18 Cloud, supra note 10, at 611.
19 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
20 E.g., Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 248 (1969) (discussing that development).
21 See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510-12 (1961) (cataloguing cases).
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the government could intrude and Boyd primarily concerned what objects could be
permissibly seized, they did not directly collide. Both of those lines of authority
coexisted uneasily until 1967, when the Court rejected property analysis and
substituted privacy analysis to measure the scope of the Fourth Amendment's
protections. Warden v. Hayden,22 written by Justice Brennan, rejected any
hierarchy of property rights and any substantive restrictions on the ability of the
government to search personal property. Katz, the better known but less
articulately reasoned case, rejected Olmstead's view that the country was divided
into two areas-those that were constitutionally protected and those that were not.
In Katz, federal agents placed an electronic listening and recording device outside
a public phone booth, from which Katz placed his calls.23 Both Hayden and Katz
asserted that privacy, not property, was the centralizing principle upon which
Fourth Amendment rights were premised. The Katz Court did not base that
conclusion on a broad philosophical view of the Amendment or adopt Boyd's
liberal construction of the Amendment. Indeed, it did not even cite Boyd. Its
decision was premised primarily on extending protection to intangible interests,
which was the aspect of Olmstead that had been sapped of its vitality before Katz.
In contrast, Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Olmstead, set forth a broad-based
philosophical argument, premised on the language and spirit of Boyd.24 Brandeis
began with the proposition that, because it was a constitution that the Court was
expounding, which was to be applied "over objects of which the fathers could not
have dreamed," the Court had to adopt a construction capable of meeting modem
conditions. 25 Brandeis emphasized that technology allowed invasions of privacy
uncontemplated by the Framers and that
"time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and
purposes." Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy
have become available to the government. Discovery and invention have
made it possible for the government, by means far more effective than
stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is
26
whispered in the closet.
Brandeis favored giving the Amendment broad scope, stating: "Every unjustifiable
intrusion by the government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the
means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment."27
Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court in Katz was therefore notable for what
22 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
23 Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
24 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472-75 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
25 Id. at 472.
26 Id. at 473.
27 Id. at 478.
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it did not say. It did not rely on Boyd or Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead. It offered
no broad philosophical basis for its decision; there was no vision. It merely
substituted terms: people, not places; privacy, not property. If the promise of Katz
was that privacy would broaden protections when substituted for property analysis,
subsequent decisions demonstrated that that promise has been unfulfilled. 28
Instead, the effect of Katz was narrow, affirming that the protections of the
Amendment extended to intangible interests such as phone conversations.
The Court thereafter adopted the reasonable expectation of privacy test to
define, at least in large part, the Amendment's protections. 29  That test, from
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz, requires that a person exhibit an
actual subjective expectation of privacy and that this expectation be one that
society recognizes as reasonable.30 This was unlike the majority opinion, which
spoke in terms of unadorned "privacy," without modification by any inquiry into
subjectivity or reasonableness. Also, unlike the majority, Justice Harlan concluded
that the phone booth was a constitutionally protected area. Harlan stated that,
although the Fourth Amendment protects people not places, "[g]enerally . . . the
answer to that question requires reference to a 'place.'" 3
The Court's expectation of privacy analysis has many flaws, 32 including its
lack of textual support in the language of the Amendment. It accordingly leaves
the fluid concept of privacy to the vagaries of shifting Court majorities, which are
able to manipulate the concept at will. Indeed, it is difficult-if not impossible-
to say exactly what the concept means. 3 Justice Scalia has observed that the
reasonableness of an expectation of privacy bears an "uncanny resemblance" to
28 CLANCY, FOURTH AMENDMENT, supra note 2, at § 3.3. One interpretation of Katz was that
it collapsed the applicability inquiry into a one-sided question: any invasion of a reasonable
expectation of privacy is a search. That view was never adopted by the Court and Jones illustrates
the continued two-sided nature of the inquiry.
29 E.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 214 (1986).
3o See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
31 Id. One fundamental aspect of Supreme Court analysis until Katz was the relational aspect
of the concept of security; a person was secure in specified objects-one's person, house, papers, and
effects. That analysis was, of course, driven by the language of the Amendment. E.g., Hester v.
United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924). Katz seemingly decoupled that relationship with a broad
substitution of privacy: people, not places were protected. The Court's subsequent cases confronted
whether privacy protections were limited to the four objects specified in the Amendment. E.g.,
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984). Over the succeeding years, the relational aspect of a
person's protected interest to the objects specified in the Amendment has sometimes reappeared.
E.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43 (1988). In Jones, the Court explicitly reaffirmed that
relationship.
32 The academic critics are legion but those critics generally embrace privacy as the protected
interest and argue that the Court has done a poor job of utilizing it. See CLANCY, FOURTH
AMENDMENT, supra note 2, at § 3.3.5. (collecting authorities).
3 E.g., Christopher Slobogin, Technologically-Assisted Physical Surveillance: The American
Bar Association's Tentative Draft Standards, 10 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 383, 439-40 (1997) (ABA task
force concluded that it could not define it).
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what a majority of the Court concludes is reasonable. 34 Beyond self-indulgence
and case-by-case conclusions, little has been said by the Court that has endured
36
as a reliable measure of the reasonableness of a privacy expectation. Addressing
the admitted difficulties of the Katz analysis, that is, its circularity3 7 and the
concern with judges imposing their own conceptions of expectations of privacy,
Justice Alito in his concurring opinion in Jones pointed to another fundamental
problem:
[T]he Katz test rests on the assumption that this hypothetical reasonable
person has a well-developed and stable set of privacy expectations. But
technology can change those expectations. Dramatic technological
change may lead to periods in which popular expectations are in flux and
may ultimately produce significant changes in popular attitudes. New
technology may provide increased convenience or security at the expense
of privacy, and many people may find the tradeoff worthwhile. And
even if the public does not welcome the diminution of privacy that new
technology entails, they may eventually reconcile themselves to this
development as inevitable.
There is no better demonstration of the self-indulgence and bankruptcy of
privacy analysis than Justice Alito's opinion in Jones, where he concluded that a
physical invasion of a vehicle to insert a GPS device, coupled with short term
monitoring of that device, would not implicate any privacy expectation that society
would recognize as legitimate.39
To the extent that there are criteria to measure privacy expectations, it was set
forth in Rakas v. United States,40 where the Court observed that the reasonableness
of an expectation of privacy is grounded in principles outside the Amendment,
with the Court specifically listing real property law, personal property law, and
"understandings that are recognized or permitted in society" as bases. The Court
explained:
One of the main rights attaching to property is the right to exclude others,
and one who owns or lawfully possesses or controls property will in all
34 Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring).
3 See CLANcY, FOURTH AMENDMENT, supra note 2, at § 3.3.4., § 3.3.5.
36 Acknowledgments of the possibility of a normative approach are rare. E.g., Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979). A persistent minority view has advocated such an
approach. E.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 220 n.5 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting).
3 E.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) ("Katz test ... has often been criticized
as circular, and hence subjective and unpredictable.").
38 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
3 Id. at 964.
40 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978).
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likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of this right
to exclude. Expectations of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment,
of course, need not be based on a common-law interest in real or
personal property, or on the invasion of such an interest . . . . But by
focusing on legitimate expectations of privacy in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, the Court has not altogether abandoned use of property
concepts in determining the presence or absence of the privacy interests
protected by that Amendment. No better demonstration of this
proposition exists than the decision in Alderman[ v. United States, 394
U.S. 165 (1969)], where the Court held that an individual's property
interest in his own home was so great as to allow him to object to
electronic surveillance of conversations emanating from his home, even
though he himself was not a party to the conversations.41
Rakas's reliance on property law signaled the re-emergence of property law as
a source of Fourth Amendment protections but it was used as a means to measure
the legitimacy of an expectation of privacy. The "understandings" standard,
discussed most often by the Court in the context of social guests,42 has not proved
to be a standard that expands Fourth Amendment protections much beyond that
afforded by property law. Indeed, while a liberal Court substituted privacy in lieu
of property analysis to expand protected interests, the more conservative Courts
that followed after Katz often employed privacy analysis as a vehicle to restrict
43Fourth Amendment protections.
IV. JONES
In United States v. Jones, the Court unanimously found that the attachment of
a global positioning system tracking device to an individual's vehicle, and its
subsequent use to monitor the vehicle's movements on public streets for 28 days,
was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.44 Justice Scalia wrote
for a majority of five justices. Justice Sotomayor joined the majority opinion but
41 id.
42 E.g., Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990) (discussing "understandings" recognized
as reasonable by society).
43 CLANCY, FOURTH AMENDMENT, supra note 2, at §§ 3.3.3-3.3.4. (tracing that development).
4 The agents installed the GPS device on the undercarriage of the Jeep while the vehicle was
parked in a public parking lot and monitored it for 28 days, tracking the vehicle's movements. Jones,
132 S. Ct. at 948. The Court only determined that the Fourth Amendment was implicated; it did not
decide whether the Amendment was satisfied. Left undecided was whether a warrant is required or
whether, consistent with the Carroll doctrine, probable cause suffices to justify the search of a
vehicle. Justice Alito, concurring, stated that "where uncertainty exists with respect to whether a
certain period of GPS surveillance is long enough to constitute a Fourth Amendment search, the
police may always seek a warrant." Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
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also wrote a separate concurring opinion.45  Justice Alito, joined by Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, wrote a separate opinion concurring only in the
result.46
The various opinions in Jones, to be best understood, can be divided into two
parts. The first aspect is the actual situation before the Court-the physical
invasion of the Jeep to insert the GPS device and its subsequent monitoring. The
second aspect is the willingness of the various Justices to opine about devices and
surveillance techniques that do not depend on a physical intrusion and Justice
Alito's embrace of the reasonable expectations of privacy test as the sole measure
to determine if the Amendment is applicable. I divide the analysis below into
those two categories.
A. Physical Intrusion Plus Monitoring
Justice Scalia, for the Jones majority, relied on the traditional property law
framework. Justice Scalia had no problem demonstrating that Jones had a
protected interest-a vehicle is an "effect," one of the four objects explicitly listed
as protected by the Amendment.47 Frankly, to the extent that he did so, there is
nothing significant in his opinion. What appears new in Justice Scalia's opinion is
his recharacterization of how property is used: prior to Katz, property was viewed
as a protected interest; in Katz, that view was rhetorically rejected in favor of
privacy as a centralizing principle. However, in the wake of Katz, the Court
quickly returned property to a central role but that role was often obscured by
subsuming property into the reasonable expectations of privacy formula. Hence, a
property right was a manner in which a person was said to have a reasonable
expectation of privacy. Justice Scalia, in Jones, returned to the pre-Katz view:
property is an independent protected right, not the way in which a person obtains a
reasonable expectation of privacy. 48  However, Justice Scalia did not make
property-based analysis the exclusive manner to determine if a person had a
protected interest; in contrast to his previously expressed disdain for the reasonable
expectation of privacy test, Justice Scalia in Jones accepted that test as an
additional way for a person to have a protected interest.49
Justice Scalia also examined the governmental side of the inquiry: what
governmental activity should be considered a "search"? Justice Scalia stated: "By
45 Id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
46 Id. at 957 (Alito, J., concurring).
47 The vehicle was registered to Jones's wife but he used it; the majority essentially assumed
that Jones had standing as to the Jeep. Id. at 949 n.2 (majority opinion).
48 See also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34-36 (2002) (adopting similar view). Cf
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring) (recognizing continued
viability of the physical trespass framework after Katz to regulate "physical intrusion of a
constitutionally protected area in order to obtain information").
49 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953.
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attaching the device to the Jeep, officers encroached on a protected area."o The
trespassory attachment, by itself, was insufficient to implicate the Amendment.51
In addition, Justice Scalia alternatively indicated that, for a search to occur, the
government must have attached the device with the purpose of obtaining
information or that there had to be subsequent use of the device. 52 The various
formulations appear to offer two very different predicates for the governmental
actions to be labeled a search: the government must actually obtain information or
it merely has to seek to obtain information. Perhaps the differences are of no
significance in criminal cases (such as Jones), given that the information obtained
likely would be the incriminating evidence. However, in civil cases, the point at
which the search occurred would matter, if the mere attempt to obtain information
sufficed. The latter view appears more consistent with previous case law and
Justice Scalia's previously stated views."
Justice Sotomayor joined Justice Scalia's opinion to make it a majority,
finding the property framework sufficient to resolve Jones. However, Justice
Sotomayor's concurring opinion contained the same ambiguity regarding whether
a search required an attempt to obtain information or actually obtaining
information. Most of Justice Sotomayor's concurrence, discussed infra, detailed
her views regarding the reasonable expectations of privacy framework, which
"augmented, but did not displace or diminish, the common-law trespassory test
50 Id. at 952.
5 The majority's approach allowed it to leave intact the results in the earlier beeper cases.
See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
52 Justice Scalia indicated that a search occurred based on the attachment plus, alternatively,
the "subsequent use of that device to monitor the vehicle's movements on public streets," the
physical occupation "for the purpose of obtaining information," the "information gained," and the
"physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area in order to obtain information." Jones, 132 S.
Ct. at 948-51. He emphasized at one point: "Trespass alone does not qualify, but there must be
conjoined with that what was present here: an attempt to find something or to obtain information.
Related to this .. . is the concurrence's point that, if analyzed separately, neither the installation of the
device nor its use would constitute a Fourth Amendment search. Of course not. A trespass on
'houses' or 'effects,' or a Katz invasion of privacy, is not alone a search unless it is done to obtain
information; and the obtaining of information is not alone a search unless it is achieved by such a
trespass or invasion of privacy." Id. at 951 (emphasis added).
s3 See, e.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32 n.l ("[w]hen the Fourth Amendment was adopted, as now,
to 'search' meant '[t]o look over or through for the purpose of finding something; to explore; to
examine by inspection; as, to search the house for a book; to search the wood for a thief'"). Justice
Brennan, dissenting in Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 459 (1963), stated: "In every-day talk,
as of 1789 or now, a man 'searches' when he looks or listens. Thus we find references in the Bible to
'searching' the Scriptures (John V, 39); in literature to a man 'searching' his heart or conscience; in
the law books to 'searching' a public record. None of these acts requires a manual rummaging for
concealed objects.... [J]ust as looking around a room is searching, listening to the sounds in a room
is searching. Seeing and hearing are both reactions of a human being to the physical environment
around him-to light waves in one instance, to sound waves in the other. And, accordingly, using a
mechanical aid to either seeing or hearing is also a form of searching. The camera and the dictaphone
both do the work of the end-organs of an individual human searcher-more accurately."
2012] 3 11
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that preceded it." 54
Justice Alito, in his concurring opinion, rejected as "unwise" the majority's
property-based analysis, viewing it as "strain[ing] the language of the Fourth
Amendment," with "little if any support in current Fourth Amendment case law."55
For himself and three other Justices, Justice Alito asserted that the reasonable
expectations of privacy formula is the sole measure of a person's Fourth
Amendment rights implicated by a search. Yet, Justice Alito's broad assertions
about the singular role that privacy analysis has had in the wake of Katz are not
supported by the Court's cases.56 Indeed, no post-Katz majority of the Court has
ever construed privacy's role as broadly as Justice Alito did in Jones. Justice
Alito's opinion is remarkable for a related reason, that is, he viewed an installation
and short term use of a GPS device as not implicating the Amendment.
Justice Alito believed "the Court's reasoning largely disregard[ed] what is
really important (the use of a GPS for the purpose of long-term tracking) and
instead attache[d] great significance to something that most would view as
relatively minor (attaching to the bottom of a car a small, light object that does not
S4 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
ss Id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring).
56 E.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 n.4 (1967) ("The average man would very
likely not have his feelings soothed any more by having his property seized openly than by having it
seized privately and by stealth.. And a person can be just as much, if not more, irritated, annoyed and
injured by an unceremonious public arrest by a policeman as he is by a seizure in the privacy of his
office or home."). Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56 (1992), cited in Jones, is a significant post-
Katz articulation of what the Amendment protects. Soldal concluded that the physical removal of a
trailer home from a mobile home park by disconnecting it from the sewer and water connections and
towing it out of the park was a seizure. The Court stated that a seizure of property occurs when there
has been some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interest in the property.
Justice White, writing for an unanimous Court, proclaimed that "our cases unmistakably hold that the
Amendment protects property as well as privacy." Id. at 62. The Court also identified one other
interest protected by the Amendment-namely, a person's "liberty interest in proceeding with his
itinerary" unimpeded by the government. Id. at 63 n.8. White further opined that the shift in the
emphasis in Katz and Hayden to privacy had not "snuffed out the previously recognized protection of
property under the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 64. White repeated Katz's assertion that the Fourth
Amendment did not confer a "general constitutional right to privacy" and that, although it protected
individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion, its protections went further, and
often had nothing to do with privacy. Id. He concluded that what is protected and "[w]hat matters is
the intrusion on the people's security from governmental interference." Id. at 69.
Even Justice Brennan, a primary architect of privacy analysis, wrote that, although one aspect
of privacy is the right to keep certain information beyond the scrutiny of public officials, the Fourth
Amendment does "not protect only information. It also protects, in its own sometimes-forgotten
words, '[tihe right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and effects."' Illinois v.
Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 775 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). He observed that, "[b]efore Katz, this
Court may have focused too much on the 'security' aspect of the right of privacy, while giving short
shrift to its 'secrecy' aspect. In recognizing the importance of secrecy, however, Katz did not
extinguish the relevance of security." Id. at 776 n.4. He concluded: "[T]he Fourth Amendment
protects security as well as secrecy." Id. at 778.
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interfere in any way with the car's operation)." 7 He also saw the Court's approach
as "lead[ing] to incongruous results" and "vexing problems."58 His concerns
included longer term surveillance using unmarked cars and aerial assistance, radio
activation of a stolen vehicle detection system that came installed in a vehicle
when purchased, and situations where the government required "or persuaded auto
manufacturers to include a GPS tracking device in every car."59
B. Obtaining Information Without Physical Intrusion
Jones offered a variety of views and intuitions about the government's use of
technology to obtain information without a physical invasion. Justice Alito, who
argued that the reasonable expectation of privacy formula was the exclusive test,
appeared to reformulate it: "The best that we can do in this case is to apply existing
Fourth Amendment doctrine and to ask whether the use of GPS tracking in a
particular case involved a degree of intrusion that a reasonable person would not
have anticipated."60 Note that the emphasis in Justice Alito's language focuses on
the relationship of the government technique to a person's reasonable expectations.
The Harlan test, in contrast to Justice Alito's formulation, requires that a person
exhibit an actual subjective expectation of privacy and that that expectation be one
that society recognizes as reasonable. If either prong is missing, no protected
interest is established. Under that formulation, the technique used by the
government did not affect the reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy.
Justice Alito appeared to shift the focus from a societal expectations test to a
reasonable person test, with no subjective element and a sliding scale of intrusion.
Applying his formula, Justice Alito believed that "relatively short-term
monitoring of a person's movements on public streets" did not implicate the
Amendment but that "longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most
offenses" did.6 1 He saw no need to "identify with precision the point at which the
tracking of this vehicle became a search, for the line was surely crossed before the
4-week mark." 62
Justice Alito said that the Amendment would apply to longer term GPS
monitoring of "most offenses" but reserved the question of whether it would apply
to "extraordinary offenses" because "long-term tracking might have been mounted
using previously available techniques" in such cases. That position confuses
Fourth Amendment satisfaction with Fourth Amendment applicability: it may be
57 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 961 (Alito, J., concurring).
ss Id. at 962.
6 Id. at 961.
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reasonable to monitor "extraordinary offenses" under circumstances that would not
justify monitoring of "most offenses," but such monitoring does not somehow
make the Amendment inapplicable. Nor does the choice by the government to
utilize a technique that would otherwise constitute a "search" make the
Amendment inapplicable merely because the government could have obtained the
information by other means that did not implicate it. Noting the "novelty" of
Justice Alito's framework, Justice Scalia, in his majority opinion, added these
criticisms:
[I]t remains unexplained why a 4-week investigation is "surely" too long
and why a drug-trafficking conspiracy involving substantial amounts of
cash and narcotics is not an "extraordinary offens[e]" which may permit
longer observation. What of a 2-day monitoring of a suspected purveyor
of stolen electronics? Or of a 6-month monitoring of a suspected
terrorist? We may have to grapple with these "vexing problems" in some
future case where a classic trespassory search is not involved and resort
must be had to Katz analysis; but there is no reason for rushing forward
to resolve them here.64
Moving beyond GPS monitoring, all of the opinions were drawn into the
thicket of when the government's use of surveillance technology implicates the
Amendment. Justice Scalia, however, did not go very far.65 In Jones, he accepted
the reasonable expectation of privacy framework as a modern supplement to the
traditional property-based analysis. Nonetheless, Justice Scalia intimated that the
expectations formula would not protect against non-trespassory surveillance of
movements in public. He started with the established principles that "mere visual
observation" was not a search and that in Knotts, the Court stated that "[a] person
traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation
of privacy in his movements from one place to another."6 He then observed:
Thus, even assuming that the concurrence is correct to say that
"[t]raditional surveillance" of Jones for a 4-week period "would have
required a large team of agents, multiple vehicles, and perhaps aerial
assistance," our cases suggest that such visual observation is
constitutionally permissible. It may be that achieving the same result
through electronic means, without an accompanying trespass, is an
unconstitutional invasion of privacy, but the present case does not
require us to answer that question. 67
6 Id. at 954 (majority opinion).
65 This is in sharp contrast to Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Kyllo, where he advocated a
bold approach. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 41 (2002).
66 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953.
67 Id. at 953-54.
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Justice Sotomayor observed that physical intrusions are "now unnecessary to
many forms of surveillance" and that the government could duplicate the
monitoring undertaken in Jones "by enlisting factory- or owner-installed vehicle
tracking devices or GPS-enabled smartphones."a In "cases of electronic or other
novel modes of surveillance that do not depend upon a physical invasion on
property," she believed the Katz analysis applied.69 She agreed with Justice Alito's
comments that those same technological advances also affected "the Katz test by
shaping the evolution of societal privacy expectations." 70 She also agreed "with
Justice Alito that, at the very least, 'longer term GPS monitoring in investigations
of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy."' 7  Note, however, that
Justice Sotomayor did not modify that statement with the word "reasonable."
Concerned with a "too permeating police surveillance," Justice Sotomayor instead
offered a vague set of considerations to ascertain if long- or short-term GPS
surveillance implicated the Amendment, including the details of the information
obtained about the target's movements, the storage and use of that information, the
relative ease of obtaining it compared to other techniques, and the chilling effect
on "associational and expressive freedoms."72 She asserted that such GPS
monitoring "may alter the relationship between citizen and government in a way
that is inimical to democratic society."' 73  Referring to the possibility of "a
reasonable societal expectation of privacy in the sum of one's public movements,"
she would consider "whether people reasonably expect that their movements will
be recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to ascertain,
more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on."74
Justice Alito, in his concurring opinion, made several broad observations,
suggesting that he too was just discovering the power of technology to gather
information. He listed closed-circuit television video monitoring, automatic toll
collection systems, "cars equipped with devices that permit a central station to
ascertain the car's location at any time," and smart phones equipped with GPS
devices. He noted that rise of "'crowdsourcing"' to report traffic conditions and
"'social' tools" that "allow[] consumers to find (or to avoid) others who enroll in
these services."76 He observed: "The availability and use of these and other new




72 Id. at 955-56.
7 Id. at 956 (citing United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaun,
J., concurring)).
74 id.
7 Id. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring).
76 Id.
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devices will continue to shape the average person's expectations about the privacy
of his or her daily movements."77 He added that, "[i]n the pre-computer age, the
greatest protections of privacy were neither constitutional nor statutory, but
practical."78 Now, however, devices "make long-term monitoring relatively easy
and cheap."79 Having said this, Justice Alito indicated that legislative action might
be the best solution.o
V. THE RIGHT To BE SECURE
The Fourth Amendment speaks of the right to be secure and, in my view, is
the proper measure of the protection afforded by the Amendment.1 Security from
unreasonable governmental intrusion was and is the ability to exclude the
government. For example, the foundational case of Entick v. Carrington82 cited by
the Jones majority, inextricably linked security with the ability to exclude. After
stating that the great end for which men had entered into society was to "secure"
their property, the court asserted: "No man can set his foot upon my ground
without my licence [sic]." 83 Similarly, in his famous oration against the writs of
assistance, which allowed customs officials in Massachusetts to search anywhere
they desired, James Otis argued that the writ "is against the fundamental principles
of law, the privilege of house. A man, who is quiet, is as secure in his house as a
prince in his castle[.]" 84 The history of the founding era is replete with similar
observations. In a meeting of the inhabitants of Boston in 1772, a committee was




8o Id. at 964.
8' For a discussion of the origin and meaning of the word "secure," see CLANCY, FOURTH
AMENDMENT, supra note 2, at §§ 3.1-3.4; Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment
Protect: Property, Privacy, or Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 307 (1998).
82 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765).
83 Id. at 817.
84 JOSIAH QUINCY, JR., REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY BETWEEN 1761 AND 1772 471 (1865).
85 E.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 144 (1765-69).
See also id at 129 (stating that the three rights are: "the right of personal security, the right of
personal liberty, and the right of private property"). For representative references to Blackstone's
list, see James Otis, A Vindication of the British Colonies (1765), reprinted in 1 PAMPHLETS OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 558 (Bernard Bailyn, ed. 1965) ("The absolute liberties of Englishmen, as
frequently declared in Parliament, are principally three: the right of personal security, personal
liberty, and private property."); New York Journal article, January 23, 1788, reprinted in 20
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 643 (John P. Kaminski &
Gaspare J. Saladino ed., 2004).
86 QUINCY, supra note 84, at 466.
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by order of the town, attacked the writs of assistance as giving "absolute and
arbitrary" power to customs officials to search anywhere they pleased.1 The
report concluded:
Thus our Houses, and even our Bed-Chambers, are exposed to be
ransacked, our Boxes, Trunks and Chests broke open, ravaged and
plundered . . .. Flagrant instances of the wanton exercise of this Power,
have frequently happened in this and other seaport Towns. By this we
are cut off from that domestic security which renders the Lives of the
most unhappy in some measure agreeable. These Officers may under the
color of Law and the cloak of a general warrant, break through the sacred
Rights of the Domicil, ransack Mens [sic] Houses, destroy their
Securities, carry off their Property, and with little Danger to themselves
commit the most horrid Murders. 8
The Framers valued security and intimately associated it with the ability to exclude
the government.
As noted, well before Jones, post-Katz assertions that the Amendment
protected something other than--or in addition to-privacy increased, reflecting
the inadequacy of the privacy standard as descriptive of a person's protected
interest. On some occasions, the word "security" was studiously applied. 89 For
example, in Terry v. Ohio,90 which involved the stop and frisk of a person, the
Court emphasized the words chosen by the Framers, asserting that the "inestimable
right of personal security belongs as much to the citizen on the streets of our cities
as to the homeowner closeted in his study to dispose of his secret affairs." 91
Indeed, the Court said: "'No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully
guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession
and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others,
unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law."' 92 The Court asserted that
the issue in Terry was whether the person's "right to personal security was
violated" by the on-the-street encounter. 93
The post-Katz era Court and many commentators have often confused the
reasons for exercising the protected right with the right itself. A purpose of
exercising one's Fourth Amendment rights might be the desire for privacy but the
individual's motivation is not the right protected.94 The Fourth Amendment acts
8 Id. at 467.
88 Id
89 See, e.g., supra note 56.
9o 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
' Id. at 8-9.
92 Id. at 9 (citing Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).
93 id.
94 Indeed, one concept of privacy is simply the power "to control access by others to a private
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negatively-to exclude. There is no security if one cannot exclude the government
from intruding. To look beyond the right to exclude and seek positive attributes to
the right to be secure, whether those attributes be called privacy or something else,
serves to limit-and ultimately defeat-that right.95 The Fourth Amendment is an
instrument-a gatekeeper that keeps out the government. The gatekeeper does not
ask why one desires to exclude the government; it simply follows orders.96 As a
gatekeeper, the Amendment permits other rights to flourish. However, the purpose
of exercising one's Fourth Amendment rights neither adds to nor detracts from the
scope of the protection afforded by the Amendment.
The privacy era cases have value because they afforded protection to
intangible interests against non-physical intrusions. But it was this concern with
extending protection to intangible interests and guarding against non-physical
invasions that served to distort Fourth Amendment doctrine. The most recent
illustration is Alito's concurring opinion in Jones. Little interpretative skill is
needed when the government physically invades. Olmstead and Jones demonstrate
that point. The problem arises when the government uses non-physical
investigative techniques to obtain information. In such situations, the admonition
of Boyd must be understood and applied: "It is not the breaking of his doors, and
the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is
the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and
private property" that violates the Fourth Amendment. 97  This is a call for a
normative, liberal approach to interpreting the Amendment. The inquiry must
examine the essence of what the Amendment seeks to protect: the right to be
secure-that is, the ability to exclude the government from prying.
In today's society, technological and other advances preclude the ability to
object (to a private place, to information, or to an activity). [It] is the ability to maintain the state of
being private or to relax it as, and to the degree that, and to whom one chooses." STANLEY I. BENN, A
THEORY OF FREEDOM 266 (1988). If privacy is only the power to exclude, there is no reason to refer
to the concept, which serves only to confuse what the individual's right is, particularly given the
many uses that "privacy" has. Cf Daniel B. Yeager, Search, Seizure and the Positive Law:
Expectations of Privacy Outside the Fourth Amendment, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 249, 284
(1993) ("Whatever privacy means, it surely must include the right to exclude others.").
9s Cf Laurence A. Benner, Diminishing Expectations ofPrivacy in the Rehnquist Court, 22 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 825, 827 (1989) ("[T]he Framers did not attempt to define the contours of a
comprehensive right to privacy. Rather, they attempted to construct a restraint upon governmental
action.").
96 Cf Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301 (1967) ("On its face, the [Fourth Amendment]
assures the 'right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects . . . ,' without
regard to the use to which any of these things are applied."); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Generalities of the
Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CH. L. REV. 47, 85 (1974) ("It would misconceive the great purpose of the
amendment to see it primarily as the servant of other social goods, however large and generally
valuable."); Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 771 (1964) ("Property draws a
circle around the activities of each private individual or organization. Within that circle, the owner
has a greater degree of freedom than without. Outside, he must justify or explain his actions, and
show his authority. Within, he is master, and the state must explain and justify any interference.").
9 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
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shield anything absolutely. To adequately protect and give recognition to the
ability to exclude, normative values must be employed. Do the precautions taken
by the person objectively evidence an intent to exclude the human senses? Does
the particular surveillance technique utilized by the government defeat the
individual's right to exclude? Would the "spirit motivating the framers" of the
Amendment "abhor these new devices no less" than the "direct and obvious
methods of oppression" that inspired the Fourth Amendment? 8 The answer to
those questions is always a value judgment.
Kyllo v. United States99 was the most recent case prior to Jones examining in
detail what the Amendment protects. The Court determined that the use of a
thermal imaging device aimed at a house to learn something about the interior-
the relative heat of various locations in the house-was a search. The Court's
language had much more in common with Olmstead than Katz. Yet, the Court
retained the essential lesson of Katz, which is not that the Fourth Amendment
protects privacy, but that the interests protected by the Amendment include
tangible and intangible interests and that the mode of invasion into those interests
is not limited to physical intrusions. The majority opinion of Justice Scalia
stressed the traditional importance of the home: "'At the very core' of the Fourth
Amendment stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be
free from unreasonable governmental intrusion."' 00 Kyllo rejected drawing the line
as to what constitutes a search based either on the sophistication of the surveillance
equipment or on the "intimacy" of the details that are observed.o' Instead, it drew
the line by analogy to a physical invasion: "We think that obtaining by sense-
enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that
could not otherwise have been obtained without physical 'intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area' constitutes a search." 02 The "focus," according to
the Court, was "not upon intimacy but upon otherwise-imperceptibility."' 03
Kyllo illustrates the security model of Fourth Amendment rights: the
individual has the right to exclude the government from unreasonably searching or
seizing any of the four objects the Amendment explicitly protects. After Kyllo, the
individual need not give a reason for excluding the government; she need only
assert that it is her house. The same is true in Jones: the individual need not
explain why he seeks to exclude the government from and using his vehicle as a
device to track him; it is his right to exclude the government. Note that the search
in Kyllo was not a physical invasion but that the search in Jones was. The security
afforded by the Amendment protects against both types of activity. A search
98 Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 139 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
9 533 U.S. 27 (2001). See generally Symposium, The Effect of Technological Change on
Fourth Amendment Rights and Analysis, 72 Miss. L.J. 1 (2002).
'oo Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31 (citing Silverman v. United States, 362 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
"o I1d. at 3 7.
102 Id. at 34 (citing Silverman, 362 U.S. at 512).
103 Id. at 38 n.5.
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occurs when the police learn something about the protected object that would
otherwise have been imperceptible absent a physical intrusion or its technological
substitute. Any such intrusion must be justified as reasonable. Of course, such a
framework does not free the Court from difficult line drawing. But at least there is
a coherent framework.
VI. THIRD PARTY DOCTRINE AND THE DIGITAL AGE
There is an extraordinary amount of information held by third parties and
potentially exploited by law enforcement. Broadly speaking, there are two
categories of substantive data that are of concern: the use of networks and the
Internet to transmit information from one party to another, such as the body of an
email, and the use of cloud based services to store, share, or process data. In the
non-digital world, if a third party discloses information to the government that an
individual has provided to that third party, the individual typically will not have an
interest protected by the Fourth Amendment.104 This is based on the Court's view
that no Fourth Amendment protection exists where a wrongdoer has a misplaced
belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not
reveal it. 05 Such a "risk," according to the Court, is "probably inherent in the
conditions of human society."'06 This is consistent with the Supreme Court's view
that voluntary exposure to the public eliminates Fourth Amendment protection.'0o
Justice Sotomayor in Jones questioned the application of the third party
doctrine's application to "the digital age," maintaining that it was "ill suited"
because "people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties
in the course of carrying out mundane tasks."0 s She commented on many of the
digital search and seizure issues that have been circulating for more than a decade
in the lower courts:
People disclose the phone numbers that they dial or text to their cellular
providers; the URLs that they visit and the e-mail addresses with which
they correspond to their Internet service providers; and the books,
groceries, and medications they purchase to online retailers. Perhaps, as
Justice Alito notes, some people may find the "tradeoff' of privacy for
convenience "worthwhile," or come to accept this "diminution of
privacy" as "inevitable," and perhaps not. I for one doubt that people
would accept without complaint the warrantless disclosure to the
government of a list of every Web site they had visited in the last week,
or month, or year. But whatever the societal expectations, they can attain
104 E.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
05 Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966).
106 Id. at 303.
107 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
1os United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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constitutionally protected status only if our Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence ceases to treat secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy. I
would not assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to some
member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone,
disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.109
These comments underline one fundamental flaw of the Katz framework:
Justice Sotomayor's willingness to project her concept of privacy expectations as
being coextensive with society's and hence reasonable. Further, her brief
comments about reconsidering the third party doctrine in a case where it was not in
issue seem completely random."10
When does one have the right to exclude the government from searching?"'
When one has taken steps to exclude: close the door; close the drapes; seal the
letter in an envelope; enter into a contract for a self-storage locker or a safe deposit
box. Thus, for example, Katz took steps to exclude the unwanted ear by closing
the door to the telephone booth.'12 Renters have a protected interest in storage
109 Id.
1o In contrast, in City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010), where it should have been
in issue, no Justice commented on the doctrine. Quon involved a police officer who used his
government-issued pager for personal communications; the City, which had the contract with the
provider, obtained records of the communications from the provider and an issue was whether Quon
had a privacy right in those records. Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, initially assumed that
Quon had a protected interest but found the search reasonable. Nonetheless, Justice Kennedy
discussed possible considerations as to when a person would have an expectation of privacy in
communications, including: cell phone and text message communications are so pervasive that some
persons may consider them to be essential means or necessary instruments for self-expression, even
self-identification. That might strengthen the case for an expectation of privacy. On the other hand,
the ubiquity of those devices has made them generally affordable, so one could counter that
employees who need cell phones or similar devices for personal matters can purchase and pay for
their own. And employer policies concerning communications will of course shape the reasonable
expectations of their employees, especially to the extent that such policies are clearly communicated.
Id. at 2630. Justice Scalia, concurring, found the discussion "unnecessary" and "exaggerated." Id. at
2635. He criticized the expectations formula as unworkable: "Any rule that requires evaluating
whether a given gadget is a 'necessary instrumen[t] for self-expression, even self-identification,' on
top of assessing the degree to which 'the law's treatment of [workplace norms has] evolve[d],' is (to
put it mildly) unlikely to yield objective answers." Id.
.. As to seizures, the right to exclude is an incident of ownership or rightful possession of the
property. E.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 729 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring and
dissenting) ("The owner of property, of course, has a right to exclude from it all the world, including
the Government, and a concomitant right to use it exclusively for his own purposes."); Jones, 132 S.
Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (acknowledging "inherent" privacy rights in property
possessed or controlled). Hence, I agree with Justice Stevens in Karo that it would make no
difference whether a GPS device is installed prior to or after the owner gains possession of the object.
See Karo, 468 U.S. at 729 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). If the government uses a
person's property as part of a surveillance system, the Fourth Amendment should regulate that
activity. That, in my view, is the essential lesson of cases such as Silverman, which Justice Stevens
discussed in Karo. Id. at 729-30 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
"2 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52 (Fourth Amendment protects information that a person "seeks
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lockers.' 13  The same is true in the digital world: encrypt the body of the email;
enter into a contractual relationship with a cloud computing service that offers
privacy. The Internet is not structured to protect privacy; one must take steps to
exclude. It is more like a shopping mall where there is no right to exclude (or have
privacy). Indeed, unlike the relatively passive invitations to shop that stores offer
in a mall, Internet service providers and websites are designed to obtain
information about those using the services and to exploit that information. Like
Katz, those seeking to prevent the prying must take steps to do so. An encrypted
email message is the same as a letter in a sealed envelope;1 4 surely the
government could open that flimsy white envelope and it may now have the
capacity to decrypt the message. But in both situations, the person has taken steps
that, normatively, society acknowledges as reasonable (to use privacy analysis) and
to exclude (to use security analysis).' 15 An unencrypted email is not like a letter-
it's like a post card. There are now a variety of web-based services that offer
remote storage and computing. These, in my view, are akin to a self-storage unit;
the parties enter into a contract that, normatively, gives the individual a protected
interest. 16
VII. CONCLUSION
The Fourth Amendment is an instrument but it can only do so much. The
Court's inability to give guidance-any coherent framework-to new technologies
is particularly troublesome. Jones is but the most recent failure. Justice Scalia
espoused a framework that is out of fashion with many scholars and other
to preserve as private").
"' Karo, 468 U.S. at 720 n.6.
114 Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877) ("Letters and sealed packages ... are as fully
guarded against examination and inspection, except as to their outward form and weight, as if they
were retained by the parties forwarding them in their own domiciles."). Jackson distinguished letters
from mail open to inspection, such as newspapers and magazines. Id.
" Cf United States v. Ganoe, 538 F.3d 1117, 1127 (9th Cir. 2008) (person posting files in
folder on his computer to share on peer-to-peer network has no legitimate expectation of privacy and
asserting that he "lacked the technical savvy or good sense to configure LimeWire to prevent access
to his pornography files is like saying that he does not know enough to close his drapes.").
116 The contract framework does not work for email. There are a variety of service
agreements, and some are protective of privacy and some are not. Compare United States v.
Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding expectation of privacy in emails obtained from ISP)
with United States v. Warshak, 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (cataloging varieties of ISP
agreements and using a contract analysis to opine that a legitimate expectation of privacy varied with
the terms of the agreement). More fundamentally, however, once one sends an email, it passes
through many service providers, most of which are not bound by the contractual agreement that one
has with the person's internet service provider. Hence, if an email is sent by X using ISP#1 to Y,
who has a contract with ISP#2, ISP#2 is in no way bound by X's agreement with ISP#1. The
government could acquire the email from ISP#2 without implicating X's contractual rights. If X
encrypts the email, that manifestation of the intent to exclude applies to all intermediaries. Of course,
the recipient who decrypts the email could still give it to the government.
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members of the Court; however, that analysis at least provides a workable formula
to regulate physical intrusions. Justice Scalia, however, offered in Jones no real
guidance for the more important ways in which the government can obtain
information in today's world, that is, through technology that does not involve
physical invasions.
In my view, the right to exclude agents of the government is the essence of
the security afforded by the Fourth Amendment. This was the core understanding
expressed in the physical trespass theory of Olmstead and is also strongly evident
in Jones and Kyllo. The ability to exclude must extend to all invasions, tangible
and intangible, and must protect both tangible and intangible aspects of the
Amendment's protected objects. That was the essential lesson of Katz; Kyllo and
Jones appear to accept that lesson, most obviously as to the physical trespass in
Jones, but also as to the non-physical invasion in Kyllo.
If one extends that vision to all of the objects protected by the Amendment,
with the understanding that those objects include both tangible and intangible
qualities that can be the subject of either physical or non-physical invasions, the
proper scope of its protections is understood. The burden is on the individual to
take steps to exclude the government: draw the drapes; encrypt the file before
pushing the send button. Those steps to exclude do not have to be absolute-there
has always been a normative component. Once the individual has taken those
steps to exclude, the burden is on the government to justify its searches or seizures
as reasonable.
32320121

